We present sec-cs, a hash-table-like data structure for contents on untrusted storage that is provably secure and storage-efficient. We achieve authenticity and confidentiality with zero storage overhead using deterministic authenticated encryption. State-of-the-art data deduplication approaches prevent redundant storage of shared parts of different contents irrespective of whether relationships between contents are known a priori.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage solutions have become increasingly popular. They usually provide a limited amount of storage space that is accessed over the internet and used for synchronization of personal data between devices or for backups, e.g., via rsync [42] to frequently synchronize a user's data to the cloud storage. Ideally, cheap snapshot creation should be supported, i.e., the user should be able to preserve lots of consistent copies of specific states of her backed up data without being charged for redundant / duplicate data. Such snapshots / versioning features are provided by many cloud providers, e.g., Dropbox [8] , which is used by half a billion users as of 2016 [20] .
Unfortunately, security guarantees of today's popular providers are insufficient: Malicious providers could read and modify data unnoticed by their users. The above-described scenario, thus, requires application of cryptographic measures on the client side to ensure confidentiality and authenticity of outsourced data. Secure encryption using tools like GnuPG [14] , however, hides any information about contentsincluding differences across versions, preventing savings from the provider's snapshots feature. Only few systems try to combine security and storage efficiency. Neither is both secure and able to provide efficiency comparable to unencrypted storage to the best of our knowledge, so users have to decide between cheap & comfortable and expensive & secure solutions.
As we consider both aspects equally important, our goal is to advance development of practical solutions (e.g., backup systems) for cloud storage with strong security and efficiency.
To this end, we present a novel data structure for file contents on untrusted storage, sec-cs, with the following contributions:
• We design and integrate a novel chunk-based data deduplication concept, ML-*, that outperforms existing approaches w.r.t. storage efficiency given high redundancy. • We achieve strong confidentiality and authenticity of stored data with zero storage overhead. • We publish a ready-to-use implementation and evaluate its efficiency, proving superiority to other approaches.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
As both data deduplication (i.e., elimination of redundancy across stored data), and security are essential goals of sec-cs, different kinds of existing work are related. a) Data Deduplication: Existing deduplication systems apply a deterministic chunking scheme C to a content to split it into non-overlapping chunks, and avoid storage of resulting chunks that have already been stored before, usually by maintaining an index of cryptographic hash values of chunks. An overview and a classification of common approaches and their efficiency is provided by Meister and Brinkmann [29] : Whole-file chunking (WFC) yields a single chunk and is thus able to detect identical file contents. Static chunking (SC) splits a content into chunks of fixed size that are individually deduplicated, so partially overlapping contents can be deduplicated as well. It is used, e.g., in Venti [34] . Content-defined chunking (CDC) can even tolerate shifted contents. It determines chunk boundaries by moving a sliding window of fixed size W over the content and creating chunk boundaries when a window content meets a specific criterion, typically a hash value being in a specific range. This yields chunks of some expected length (target chunk length) under the assumption that different positions have different window contents and hash values are uniformly distributed. To deal with non-uniformly distributed contents, a min. and max. chunk size can be set. The scheme was introduced for the low-bandwidth network file system [32] and is usually implemented using a rolling hash, e.g., Rabin fingerprints [35] . Alternatives to the basic sliding window approach for CDC are presented, e.g., by Eshghi and Tang [11] and Xia et al. [45] . Acc. to [29] , CDC is more efficient than SC (which outperforms WFC) for real-life data. Few systems like ADMAD [27] are able to achieve even better efficiency via application-specific chunking (ASC) . ASC, however, requires knowledge about the respective file format of a content.
Instead of deduplicating identical chunks, some systems employ delta encoding: When a highly similar chunk-a base chunk-is known, a new chunk is represented as a reference to the base chunk and a difference, i.e., a sequence of actions that define how to create it from the base chunk. In combination with WFC, this is, e.g., used in version control systems (VCS) like Subversion (SVN) [41] . SVN's FSFS backend stores the first revision of a file content in its entirety and all subsequent revisions as differences to previous revisions. [5] A comparison of advantages of the different schemes is shown in Tab. I: Delta-based approaches can clearly yield lowest storage costs for changed contents in principle, but they have important limitations in practice: First, they depend on a priori knowledge of relations between chunks (a problem tackled by, e.g., DERD [7] ), so they are only applicable for specific scenarios. 1 Second, contents containing delta-encoded chunks have high retrieval costs as their reconstruction requires retrieval of corresponding base chunks of which only parts are actually required. Chunking-based schemes achieve savings irrespective of knowledge about relations: best values are highlighted in green. The most efficient strategies CDC / ASC depend on distribution of contents / specific file formats.
In addition to costs for actual content data, every data deduplication mechanism incurs storage costs for metadata: In case of WFC, this is only a small constant per content (its cryptographic hash value). Chunking-based schemes do not only incur this overhead for every chunk, but they also require space for storing of which chunks a content consists. This is typically a list of chunk identifiers, e.g., hash values. Although respective constants are small for large chunk sizes, metadata storage costs for contents deduplicated via SC/CDC/ASC are linear in their lengths no matter how high their redundancy is. These schemes' chunk size parameters, thus, considerably impact their storage efficiency, as also noticed by Eshghi/Tang [11] : If set too high, deduplication performance is decreased as only large identical chunks allow savings. If set too small, storage of contents with high redundancy causes considerable overhead due to the amount of chunk references that have to be stored. 1 If data is outsourced to cloud storage, e.g., determining these relations requires extensive communication costs or availability of a local database. This problem is solved by our proposals ML-SC/ML-CDC: Via specific multi-level application of SC/CDC, we settle for logarithmic metadata costs, achieving high storage efficiency even for small chunk sizes, independent from content sizes. To the best of our knowledge, our strategy is unique. Although Teodosiu et al. [40] and Yasa/Nagesh [1] propose recursive chunking to allow deduplication at different granularities, none of the authors consider a dynamic choice of chunking levels wherefore their solutions fail to achieve logarithmic costs. Further, their algorithms are different from ours: Yasa/Nagesh use CDC with large chunk sizes (64 KiB) and split the results into 4-KiB blocks via SC, achieving shift resistance only at coarse granularity. Teodosiu et al. consider two levels of CDC, but use the concatenation of the lowest-level chunks' digests as input for the higher level, which requires multiple passes of the chunking algorithm that can be avoided in our solution. b) Security: Lots of works exist in the related fields of cloud security and cryptographic file systems, but only few focus on authenticity and efficiency. Popular cloud storage security solutions deal with confidentiality only. BoxCryptor [4], e.g., is based on and uses a similar concept to EncFS [10]: It encrypts files symmetrically but does not provide authenticity. This enables storage-efficient snapshots of unchanged files, but costs for changed files are high due to different ciphertexts.
SiRiUS [15] , Plutus [21] and Tahoe-LAFS [44] are examples of file systems that provide authenticity: They apply SC to contents and compute a Merkle tree [30] over chunks to allow authenticity verification even for parts of contents, but they do not support deduplication: Tahoe creates entirely different ciphertexts for similar files, the others even for identical ones.
To allow efficient usage of cloud storage for, e.g., backups, more specialized tools are required. Common backup tools like duplicity [9] rely on incremental backups, i.e., they store differences to previous backups. In combination with GnuPG, snapshots can be preserved in a storage-efficient and secure manner, but communication overhead is caused when specific versions are read. VCS could be used for delta-based backups to a limited extent, but they are typically inefficient w.r.t. large files and have limited security properties: Git [12] ensures integrity/authenticity of version history by integrating signatures. Other popular VCS do not, but extensions for Mercurial [3] , [24] and SVN [25] add authenticity and storageefficient file-level encryption. Cumulus [43] is a backup system that supports large files and allows direct access to arbitrary snapshots, but it is less storage-efficient as it only deduplicates versions of the same file. Farsite [6] , in contrast, is a distributed file system targeting on chunking-based backups that deduplicates identical files despite secure encryption. It cannot save space for snapshots of different file versions, though, as it relies on WFC. Storer et al. [38] extend Farsite's concept to CDC, but do not provide explicit authenticity guarantees.
Many more works exist on cloud storage security, but most of them have a different focus and are orthogonal to ours. Athos [16] is a solution for outsourcing file systems that achieves integrity while allowing file system operations with logarithmic communication costs, however w.r.t. the number of file system entities, not w.r.t. the size of contents as in our solution. A similar goal is pursued by Heitzmann et al. [19] . Both works are based on authenticated skip lists, an authenticated data structure (ADS) proposed by [17] , while our work is based on another ADS-the Merkle tree [30] .
ADS in general is an umbrella term for data structures involving three parties (a trusted source who publishes, an untrusted responder that stores, and a user who requests data) that enable authenticated, efficient queries. [39] In this sense, sec-cs is an ADS with additional data deduplication and confidentiality: The cloud storage backend can be considered the responder and the user/client plays the roles of source and user. An overview of existing ADS and methods for constructing them are provided in [28] and [31] .
III. ML-* -MULTI-LEVEL CHUNKING Our first contribution are the chunking strategies ML-SC and ML-CDC which improve on the state of the art in terms of storage efficiency in presence of high redundancy (see Tab. I). The basic idea is simple: As the linear overhead for storing contents with a traditional strategy C is caused by the need of storing references to each part of each content, we want to also deduplicate these references. This is achieved by representing the results of C on a content m as a chunk tree t, whose
• leaf nodes represent the chunks output by C, and whose • inner nodes aggregate chunks, representing the concatenation of chunks represented by their children. In addition to leaf chunks (represented by leaf nodes), we thus create "larger" superchunks (represented by inner nodes), which we persist as well and which can be referenced directly when new contents are stored. Consequentially, each content is represented by one persisted root chunk (the chunk represented by the tree's root node, which might be a leaf or a superchunk).
Persisting a superchunk requires storing references to its children. To ease notation, we refer to storage costs of a chunk representation as its size and to the length of its represented content as its length. For leaf chunks we assume size equals length. To enable high storage efficiency, we require sublinear storage overhead for storing a content m having large overlaps with any existing content m. For this, we generate their chunk trees t, t so that the following requirements are met: R1: the (expected) size of each chunk is constant, R2: identical parts of m and m share not only leaf chunks, but also superchunks (i.e., t and t share subtrees), and R3: the heights of t and t are chosen logarithmically in the lengths of m and m , respectively. Thus, if m differs from m in only one byte, t and t shall be equal except for one chunk at each level, so that their difference consists of O (log |m|) constant-size chunks.
Different chunking strategies allow to achieve this. In the simplest case, we could aggregate fixed numbers of consecutive chunks output by SC to superchunks and continue aggregating fixed numbers of superchunks until only a single onethe root chunk-remains. This approach, however, would eradicate advantages of chunking schemes that go beyond SC. While leaf chunks output by CDC, e.g., are robust against shifting, this property would not be true for superchunks.
To account for that, we define ML-* in a general way that preserves the properties of its underlying chunking algorithm C. The only requirement is that C has to be deterministic and have a parameter S corresponding to the target (expected) length of its generated chunks. Now let R < S be the size required for representing a chunk reference, i.e., anything that allows retrieval of the corresponding chunk (R is constant as references are typically hashes). We define the alg. ML-C for chunk tree generation (see Fig. 1 for an illustration) as follows:
• On input a content m with length n = |m|, choose the height h of the to-be-built chunk tree t as
where h = 0 describes a single-node tree. • Create root node of t that should represent m. • Iterate over the nodes of the tree in a breadth-first search manner. For each node with height h > 0 (beginning with the root node having height h = h), determine contentm that the node represents, apply the chunking strategy C onm with target chunk length S h /R h −1 , and add a child node for each chunkm output by C. This way, a content smaller than or equal to the target chunk size S results in a single leaf node, and for n ≥ S, all leaf chunks have target size S. As superchunks at height h have expected length S h +1 /R h and are split to chunks of target length S h /R h −1 , they are expected to have S /R children. As child references have size R, the expected size of superchunks is S as well, fulfilling Req. R1. Req. R3 is met by the choice of h and R2 is expected to be achieved due to straightforward application of C at each level. The latter is concretized in Sec. IV-D1 and discussed and evaluated in detail in Sec. VII.
IV. SEC-CS -THE SECURE CONTENT STORE For detailed analysis, we embed ML-* in a data structure. sec-cs acts like a normal hash table that assigns a deterministic hash to each inserted content, but comes with a combination of properties different from prior work: It employs multi-level chunking to significantly reduce storage overhead for overlapping contents and it guarantees authenticity & confidentiality.
Note that sec-cs is limited to immutable contents, i.e., it does not support deletion. We present this variant as it is sufficient for evaluation of ML-*, but we emphasize it is easy to extend it to a mutable variant, either by allowing deletion of root nodes (requiring garbage collection), or using reference counters for chunks (at the cost of some storage overhead). In fact, our implementation (see Sec. VI) supports the latter. 
A. Prerequisites
sec-cs requires a backend to persist data. Low-level storage management is out of scope of this paper, though. Instead, we assume the existence of a backend providing the following key-value store (KVS) interface:
This interface can be mapped to any common storage backend: Key-value databases and many cloud storage providers can be accessed by this interface and a mapping to a directory hierarchy is straightforward. The major requirement is that the backend can deal efficiently with many key/value pairs.
B. Threat Model
The goal of sec-cs is to allow efficient and secure usage of existing cloud storage for file contents, especially in presence of many (similar) versions of contents and an untrusted provider. Towards this goal, our model includes two parties, a user (client) and a backend (server). The user is assumed to be trustworthy: She instantiates the data structure and locally executes its operations to change its state. Any operation invocation by the user is considered legitimate. The user is required to locally store and keep secret a fixed number of cryptographic keys. The backend does not need to be trustworthy at all. It might read and also write/overwrite/delete any stored data as to perform malicious modifications undetected by the user. The only restriction is that it is assumed not to be able to get access to the client's cryptographic keys.
We aim for authenticity in the sense that only contents actually inserted by the user can be successfully retrieved 2 , and we aim for confidentiality so that the backend cannot obtain any part of any stored content. Security guarantees are defined formally in conjunction with efficiency goals in Sec. IV-D due to their interdependence. An overview is given beforehand.
C. Security Concept
Due to its efficiency guarantees, sec-cs requires a tailored security concept. We discuss reasons and design decisions now and give a formal definition thereafter. First of all, using cryptographic hashes to reference nodes of a chunk tree yields a Merkle-tree [30] -like data structure that trivially guarantees integrity of a content given its root chunk's identifier. We can use a message authentication code (MAC) with a secret, symmetric key instead of a hash to also guarantee authenticity.
Integration of confidentiality is more complicated: For ideal guarantees, we would have to encrypt contents before constructing chunk trees as to authenticate ciphertexts (encryptthen-authenticate). Unfortunately, this would prevent deduplication: With randomized encryption, it would not be possible at all; with a deterministic scheme, it would only be possible at granularity of contents. For efficiency, we have to employ encryption at granularity of chunks that are to be deduplicated.
A straightforward application of randomized encryption using the generally favorable encrypt-then-authenticate approach on chunk tree node representations, however, would still prevent deduplication as even identical nodes yielded different MAC tags (thus different keys) due to different ciphertexts. Authenticate-then-encrypt (considered secure for specific instantiations [22] ) would lead to the same problem due to randomized encryption of MAC tags. The third option would be encrypt-and-authenticate. If applied to chunk tree nodes during insertion into backend, deduplication would be possible even with randomized encryption, as each chunk tree node was associated a ciphertext only during its first insertion (keys are deterministic MACs). Encrypt-and-authenticate, however, is generically considered insecure even for practical MAC instantiations 3 , thus requiring a careful analysis of the security properties actually achieved by any specific instantiation. 4 [22] To avoid these potential pitfalls, we achieve confidentiality and authenticity by using an authenticated, deterministic encryption scheme to encrypt and authenticate chunk tree nodes before their insertion into the backend. Block cipher modes like EAX [2] and OCB [36] , [23] would be suitable for this purpose. They provide confidentiality and authenticity and their ciphertexts are length-preserving (except for the authentication tag), eliminating padding-induced storage overhead. These schemes, however, depend on a nonce that would have to be stored to allow decryption of persisted chunks, which again caused overhead. The SIV construction [37] solves this issue: by using a plaintext's MAC as IV for an underlying, conventional IV-based encryption scheme (e.g., CTR mode), it achieves authentication + length-preserving encryption. While SIV depends on a nonce, too, it is resistant to nonce reuse in the sense that no more information than whether two encrypted plaintexts are identical is leaked. [18] As we have to leak this anyway for deduplication, it is safe to use SIV without nonce.
D. Formal Definition
The data structure is now described in detail, including its interface, formal goals and internal algorithms.
1) Interface and Goals: The minimum operation set for a content data structure includes insertion and retrieval:
• k ← PUTCONTENT(m) shall insert the content m into sec-cs and make it accessible by the key k. We state the following storage efficiency goals: G1: (Expected) increase of the data structure's storage costs after PUTCONTENT(m) should be in O (|m|). G2: If m is highly redundant, i.e., another m is already stored that is identical to m except for a single sequence of δ bytes, expected increase in storage costs after PUTCONTENT(m) shall be in O (δ + log |m|). G2 is defined vaguely as precise semantics depends on C: For SC, δ is defined as the length of the smallest byte range that would have to be copied from m to m to turn m into m, or vice versa. Since CDC supports shifting, some differences between contents can be represented more compactly, i.e., by a byte sequence that is inserted at or removed from a specific offset of one content. The more efficient C is, the stronger is thus the goal. 
As any operation execution has to preserve confidentiality of all contents ever stored, we state the confidentiality goal independent from a specific operation:
G4: For each content m ever inserted, the backend must not learn anything beyond (a) its length, (b) chunk boundary positions leaked by C for target chunk sizes S,
where h is chosen as in Eq. 1 for n = |m|, and (c) equality of chunks acc. to these boundaries (w.r.t. all leaf and superchunks ever stored). Constraints G4b/G4c are unavoidable for achieving storage efficiency (cf. Sec. IV-C), so strength of G4 depends on C.
2) Parameters: The data structure's efficiency can be tuned by setting the following parameter during initialization:
• S is the target chunk size, i.e., expected size of leaf / superchunks generated by multi-level chunking. Further, an implementation-specific parameter R refers to storage costs of chunk references in superchunk representations. We require S ≥ 2R to meet G1 (see Sec. V.1).
3) Required Algorithms and Assumptions: sec-cs is based on some algorithms and assumptions:
• Let Π E = (GEN E , ENCAUTH, DECVRFY) be a DAEsecure (see [37] ), deterministic auth. encryption scheme with length-preserving ciphertexts and length-D MACs.
(As MACs are used to reference chunks, it holds R = D.) • Let C be a deterministic, single-level chunking scheme that produces chunks of a (configurable) expected length S as used in Sec. III. • We assume that the backend's storage costs for storing a key-value pair (k, v) are in O (|k| + |v|). 4) Operations: Now we are ready to define the behaviour. a) Initialization: When sec-cs is initialized, parameter S is specified and GEN E is executed to determine a symmetric cryptographic key K for authenticated encryption. 5 This somewhat unusual goal is a consequence of our focus on storage efficiency: Permitting retrieval of contents that have not been inserted before (in case they are part of an actually inserted content) allows deduplication between root and non-root superchunks of different contents, i.e., insertion of a content does not incur storage costs if it is already represented by a subtree of an existing content. The stronger goal of contents being only retrievable if they have been inserted before can trivially be achieved at the expense of slight storage overhead by including a root flag in authentication tag computation of superchunks. Note that application-specific measures, e.g., against malicious deletion or rollback attacks, are outside the scope of this paper. b) Content Insertion: k ← PUTCONTENT(m): Insertion of contents is performed acc. to our scheme ML-C (Sec. III) which is refined here. First, height h of the chunk tree t for m is calculated acc. to Eq. 1. The tree is then built and its nodes are persisted using the recursive Alg. 1, which utilizes C to perform the respective chunking of m at each level and yields key k of the root node. We return k = (k , h) as key of m. Inclusion of h is an auxiliary construction enabling equal length/size for leaf chunks (not requiring storage of node type).
Node persistence is performed using PUT. Confidentiality is achieved by encrypting node representations; dedup./auth. are achieved by using MACs as keys. As superchunks are represented as lists of children's keys, this yields a Merkle-Tree-like structure of MACs, achieving authentication of contents.
Algorithm 1 Chunk insertion
Precondition: m is content, h ≥ 0 height of to-be-created tree 
4:
if DECVRFY failed then Failure abort on invalid MAC 5:
We also designed more computationally efficient, singlepass variants of these operations. They are omitted from the paper, but included in our implementation (Sec. VI).
V. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS We show the operations achieve the goals from Sec. IV-D1, based on C's ability to produce chunks of an expected length. a) Content Insertion: Insertion builds a chunk tree whose nodes at each level each represent the whole inserted content. All nodes are persisted in the backend and made accessible by individual keys. As the root node's key transitively allows access to all nodes, the operation is consistent with the required interface. As per-chunk storage costs are constant (R1, proven in Sec. III), it is sufficient to consider the number of modified chunks to analyze the operation's asymptotic costs.
Goal G1 requiring linear storage costs for a content m is achieved due to the following argument: As leaf chunks have equal size/length and as there cannot be more than |m| leaf chunks, storage costs of all leaf chunks are in O (|m|). Further, as we have S ≥ 2R, every superchunk is expected to have at least two children, implying less expected superchunks than leaf chunks. This proves O (|m|) total expected storage costs.
Goal G2 is analyzed in detail in Sec. VII, so we only provide an informal argument here: As described in Sec. III, a content differing in one byte from an existing content has storage costs O (log |m|). The main technical difference when δ consecutive bytes differ instead of 1 byte is that those δ bytes might be spread over multiple chunks. Concerning storage costs, this is similar to inserting those δ bytes as a separate content with costs O (δ), resulting in total storage costs of O (δ + log |m|). b) Content Retrieval: Retrieval retrieves all nodes of a previously built chunk tree and concatenates its leaf chunks, trivially fulfilling the interface. To prove authenticity, we formalize G3 with the authenticity-breaking game:
1) The data structure is initialized.
2) An adversary A is given oracle access to INSERTCON-TENT and to the implementation of sec-cs. She may issue queries at choice to fill it and is granted full read/write access to the backend. 3) At some point, A outputs an identifier k. 4) We say A wins iff a retrieve query for k returns m but a different m was inserted under identifier k before. Using this game, the authenticity property can be shown: Claim. If MACs produced by Π E are unforgeable under a chosen message attack, no adversary can win the authenticitybreaking game with non-negligible probability.
Proof: Assume A wins the game with non-negligible probability. Let k be the identifier and let m be the forged content returned by retrieve. As the operation only depends on GETCHUNK calls, which in turn only depend on GET operations, at least one GET during retrieve must have returned a forged result. Let c ← GET(k ) be the first such call. By definition of Alg. 2, verification of k being a correct MAC for v must have been true for retrieve to be successful. Then, as A knows the algorithms used by the data structure, A is able to find two different values v, v with identical MAC k (the initially inserted and the forged value). As Π E 's MACs are assumed to be unforgeable, this happens only with negligible probability, contradicting our assumption and proving G3. c) Content Confidentiality: G4 states an adversary must not learn more about any m ever stored than its length, chunk boundaries, and equality relations across all stored chunks. To prove nothing more is leaked, we show intentionally leaked information suffices for consistent simulation of all operations.
Let M be the set of contents for which PUTCONTENT is executed at any time, let m ∈ M be any fixed content and let A be an adversary trying to obtain information about m. Acc. to G4a, A is allowed to know the content's length |m|. The data structure's parameters (Sec. IV-D2) are public, so A can determine the height h of the chunk tree t of m (Eq. 1).
G4b reveals chunk boundaries of m output by C for chunk sizes S, S 2 /R, . . . , S h /R h−1 , which are exactly the boundaries computed during a legitimate PUTCONTENT(m) call, i.e., in line 7 of Alg. 1. In combination with the length of m, A can, thus, determine the byte ranges of all leaf and superchunks of m. This allows her to construct an abstract chunk treê t that has the exact same structure as t, but whose nodes contain abstract chunk representations that represent only the respective chunks' lengths instead of actual chunk contents.
As equality of any two chunks ever stored is leaked (G4c), A can further assign a unique identifier to every node so that identifiers of two nodes are equal iff their represented chunks are identical. W.l.o.g., we assume A assigns identifiers of form
wherek is a value of length R chosen uniformly at random andv is a value chosen uniformly at random whose length equals the represented chunk's length in case of a leaf chunk or y · R in case of a superchunk with y children.
Now we can show that A can also be provided with encrypted and authenticated representations of all chunks ever stored without revealing further information about any m. Claim. If Π E is DAE-secure, the probability that an adversary learns anything beyond G4 about any content m from the nodes stored in the data structure is negligible.
Proof: Assume A can learn anything beyond the aforementioned information with non-negligible probability. First, it is easy to see that she cannot learn anything from lengths of actual chunk representations as they are equal to those of her previously generated chunk identifiers. Thus, she must be able to distinguish whether given actual representations or random strings of respective lengths. Let A be her algorithm that on input the information about all contents ever stored as stated in G4 and a set of chunk representations outputs 1 if they are actual representations and 0 otherwise. We construct algorithm B with access to an ENCMAC oracle (with random key):
1) Initialize a new sec-cs data structure and insert all contents m ∈ M , using the oracle as encryption function, but remembering and reusing outputs for repeated inputs. 2) Pass all information about every content of M as stated in G4 and all (encrypted and authenticated) chunk representations to A and return its output x. If B has access to an ENCMAC oracle, A is given actual chunk representations; in case of a random oracle $, A gets random data of respective lengths. If A is able to distinguish both cases with non-negligible probability, B would distinguish a random from an encryption oracle. Acc. to the definitions given in [37] , B would be an adversary with non-negligible DAE-advantage, which contradicts the assumption that Π E is DAE-secure.
At this point, A knows the chunk tree t for every m ever stored in a sec-cs instance, including every node's (encrypted) chunk representation. We have seen that A cannot obtain more information about any content based on this than stated in G4. Now we show even metadata (access patterns from individual operation executions) do not reveal anything more. The idea of the proof is as follows: When an operation is executed, A can only see KVS operation calls made by sec-cs. If based on information she already has, A can simulate every execution so that KVS calls are consistent to a real one, she does not learn anything from a real execution.
Consider PUTCONTENT(m): Its execution consists of a call of Alg. 1 with additional argument h. A knows h but cannot provide m to simulate that call. Alg. 1 can be executed consistently given t, though: Consider any execution of PUTCHUNK(m , h ). If h = 0, a leaf chunk of t is encrypted, authenticated and inserted using PUT. As that representation is included in t, A can issue the PUT call of line 4. Otherwise, Alg. 1 performs chunking on m , issues recursive calls for the results and inserts an encrypted, authenticated superchunk. A can perform the recursive calls by extracting the children of the current node from t and she can get the superchunk representation c , k (line 10) as it is contained in t. Since they depend only on k , c and the children's identifiers, she can also issue the GET and PUT calls from lines 11-12.
The call of Alg. 2 during GETCONTENT(k) is possible for A due to the same reasons. Each recursive GETCHUNK call corresponding to a node of t can be trivially simulated: The only operation not directly executable by A is DECVRFY in line 3. For the simulation, though, it is sufficient to distinguish three cases. First, DECVRFY fails if k is not a valid authentication tag for c . Since A knows the correct representation k , c of the chunk from t, she can assume the tag is correct iff c = c except with negl. probability. Second, if h > 0, k is the identifier of a superchunk, so v is a list of its children's keys, which A can extract from t. Only if h = 0, A fails to compute v in line 2. Since there is no subsequent KVS communication, though, the simulation is still consistent.
A's simulations being consistent proves Goal G4. 6 VI. IMPLEMENTATION To ease adoption in practice and allow for empirical evaluation, we created an implementation. Data structure and chunking scheme ML-* are wrapped into a Python module available for download in PyPI [33] via pip install seccs. Unit tests verifying correctness w.r.t. G1, G2 and G3 are bundled.
As we could not find a sufficiently efficient rolling hash Python implementation, we also developed and published a chunking module fastchunking, which is a wrapper for parts of the highly efficient ngramhashing C++ library [13] and thus able to outperform pure-Python implementations.
VII. EVALUATION We confirmed sec-cs's storage efficiency analytically and empirically and compared its novel chunking scheme ML-* to other approaches, showing superiority when storing redundant data. Due to space restrictions, we focus on the analysis here and only briefly summarize our empirical results. The complete empirical evaluation can be found in the extended version of this paper [26] . 6 Note that choice of C defines a trade-off between confidentiality and storage efficiency. If C, e.g., was WFC, strongest security guarantees could be achieved (at cost of storage efficiency): G4b would not leak any information at all and G4c would only leak equality of complete contents. If SC was used, G4b would still not leak any information as its output depends only on a content's length which is covered by G4a, but equality of (small) chunks naturally provides an adversary with more information. For CDC, after all, G4b becomes relevant as chunk boundaries are computed based on plaintext content parts. Precise security implications depend on the specific scheme and cannot be determined in general. An analysis for one scheme is given in [25] .
A. Storage Performance of sec-cs
To complement the proofs from Sec. V, we evaluate G2 in detail. We do not continue an asymptotic discussion but work out concrete costs to judge suitability in practice. By storage costs, we refer to storage consumption of the KVS (Sec. IV-A) for a state. To be independent of specific backends, we ignore overheads and roughly estimate costs as sum of sizes of KVS elements, where an element's size is the length of key value.
Let m be a content consisting of random bytes already present in sec-cs. G2 states insertion of m differing only in a sequence of δ bytes should cause costs in O (δ + log |m|).
To determine these costs, we analyze the border cases first. a) Border Case: δ = |m|: If δ = |m|, chunk trees t / t of m / m are not expected to share any nodes, so storage of m is supposed to cause O (|m|) costs. 7 Since leaf chunks have average length S, t has |m| /S expected leaf nodes. For same reasons as in the proof in Sec. V.1 (S > 2R implies superchunks have ≥ 2 children on avg.), t has more exp. leaf than superchunk nodes, so its total exp. number of nodes is:
Chunk tree nodes have expected size S (Sec. III) and are stored under a D-bytes digests, so costs for this case are:
b) Border Case: δ = 1: If δ = 1, m and m differ only in 1 byte. Here, costs depend on ML-*'s underlying strategy C. If C = SC, t and t differ in exactly one node at each level, each having size ≤ S, trivially resulting in the following costs:
For C = CDC, however, the situation is more complex. First, δ = 1 allows for shifting in case of CDC. Second, t and t might differ in more than one node at each level. The reason is that the modification of a single byte might change up to W chunk boundaries at each level of the chunk tree, probably causing extra chunks to be inserted as well. To determine the total average number of chunk tree nodes inserted in this case, we analyze how many new chunks are created at each level.
Let us fix some height h , 0 ≤ h ≤ h. At height h = h we only have a single (root) chunk that represents the whole content m. At height h < h we deal with chunks of average length S h +1 /R h (a position is a boundary with probability R h /S h +1 ) according to Sec. III. When considering a fixed W -bytes window containing the changed byte, the probability that this window yields a chunk boundary in m but did not yield a chunk boundary in m is
The same probability holds for the case in which a chunk boundary present in m is not present in m anymore. As the resulting new chunks and the chunk that has to be inserted anyway at this level are not necessarily consecutive 8 , creation (omission) of a chunk boundary in contrast to m might cause up to 1 (2) additional chunks at height h , respectively. 7 Note that this case also covers Goal G1. 8 Changing a single byte might change up to W boundaries in an area of W bytes after the change position, but only the chunk before the first boundary contains the change. If two consecutive boundaries in this area exist in m and m, the chunk in between is unchanged, but might be followed by changed chunks if further boundaries are changed.
Since there are up to W window contents containing the changed byte at each chunking level and each position yields 1 or 2 new chunks each with probability
) new chunks at height h . As we have a single changed chunk at height h, we get the following upper bound for exp. number of chunk tree nodes differing between t / t :
While chunking is performed in a way that achieves an average size S for every chunk when applied to random content, we cannot assume an average size of S for additional chunks created when inserting m in addition to m . The rationale is that new chunks are created from existing chunks not chosen uniformly at random: Random positions in contents are more likely to hit large chunks than smaller ones as more positions are covered by them.
Consider the chunks of m at some fixed height h . As each byte position is a height-h chunk boundary with probability p = R h /S h +1 , the probability for a chunk having length c
As we expect an average number of |m | / 1 p chunks at height h in total, the expected number of length-c chunks at height h is |m |p · (1 − p) c−1 · p. As each of those chunks covers c bytes and total content length is |m |, the fraction of the content covered by length-c chunks is:
Thus, the expected length of a height-h chunk at a position chosen uniformly at random is:
As height-h superchunks store R-byte references to height-(h − 1) chunks of average length S h /R h −1 and as size equals length for leaf chunks, the expected size of a height-h chunk at a random position (and thus the expected size of any chunk created when inserting m) is upper-bounded by 2 · S.
This results in the following storage requirement:
c) Remaining Case: 1 < δ < |m|: In the remaining case, the first byte of the change bytestring affects chunks as in the case δ = 1. For ML-CDC, it is likely to be part of a large chunk of expected length 2S for the same reasons as above. We conservatively estimate this byte causes storage costs of ADDSTRG C h (with h = log|m| /S ( S /R) ). Remaining bytes are either part of this chunk (so costs have already been accounted for), or result in the same chunks that would be created if they were inserted as a separate content, causing costs up to STORAGE C δ−1 . Thus, we can estimate total storage costs:
As h is logarithmic in |m|, all cases fulfill Goal G2. To confirm these analytical results, we simulated the described scenario with our implementation, using randomlygenerated contents and different parameter combinations. In all experiments, actual storage costs were significantly lower than the analytical bounds, indicating that these bounds are rather conservative. The detailed results can be found in [26] .
B. Comparison of WFC / SC / CDC / ML-*
We compare performance of ML-* empirically to that of the other approaches. For fair comparison, we evaluate all schemes with sec-cs, using Π E = AES-SIV-256 with (D = 32)bytes MACs. Note that all schemes are special cases of ML-SC/ML-CDC: Fixing the height of generated chunk trees to 1 results in SC/CDC, respectively (all metadata representing a content are collected in a single root node); a fixed height 0 maps each content to a leaf-only tree, corresponding to WFC.
We instantiate sec-cs for each chunking strategy and with different chunk sizes and perform the following experiments:
We insert a fixed-size content chosen uniformly at random into the empty data structure. Then we derive a second, slightly different content by overwriting (inserting) a byte at a random offset, and insert it as well. Fig. 2 shows the increase in storage costs after insertion of the second content for each experiment (smoothed over 20 runs). For WFC, increase always corresponds to the inserted content's size. For SC/CDC, costs are only a fraction of that in the overwrite experiment (i.e., no shifting of contents) thanks to deduplication ( Fig. 2a ), but still linear in the content size. Costs of ML-SC/ML-CDC are orders of magnitude lower and sublinear in the content size. Performance of CDC/ML-CDC is hardly affected if shifting is (a) overwrite experiment (no shifting of contents) (b) insert experiment (content after change position is shifted by one byte) Fig. 2 . Measured increase in storage costs when a second, slightly modified content is inserted involved (insert, Fig. 2b ). SC/ML-SC, however, yield storage costs of about half of the content size for chunk sizes ≥ 256, corresponding to an expected amount of 50% of the content being before the shift position and thus deduplicable.
ML-*, however, incurs some metadata overhead for the first content version, making it less efficient in absence of deduplicable data. To evaluate this, we inserted several similar contents as in the insert experiment and plotted total storage costs in Fig. 3 : Few versions are sufficient for ML-CDC to yield slightly lower costs than CDC for 256 ≤ S ≤ 8192. The more versions are stored, the more significant the savings: For 125 versions, ML-CDC with 256 ≤ S ≤ 1024 requires only half of the space of the most-efficient CDC variant; for 1000 versions, costs are orders of magnitude lower. SC / ML-SC are close to WFC due to shifting and omitted for readability. Fig. 3 . Storage costs for many similar contents (first content length: 1 MiB) VIII. CONCLUSION We have introduced a data structure for encrypted and authenticated storage of file contents, sec-cs, that employs a novel multi-level chunking strategy, ML-*, to achieve storage efficiency. It transparently deduplicates parts of contents without relying on information about relations between them, and achieves storage costs for highly redundant contents logarithmic in their lengths in contrast to existing schemes.
We have proven its security and published an open source implementation as to allow integration in software projects. As next step, we work on a backup system based on sec-cs as to allow for a more extensive evaluation using real-life data.
